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Courtesy of a
Private Collection
The South Waziristan Militia was raised with the North Waziristan Militia
in 1900 from Pathans of the North-West Frontier region of British India.
Independent of the Indian Army, the Militias were under the control of
Political Agents and the Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier
Province. Their task was to largely replace the Army in tribal territory
by taking over such roles as pursuing raiders and outlaws, escorting
officers and officials, making arrests, garrisoning posts, piqueting roads
and so on. It was hoped that by employing the tribesmen themselves, the
British could maintain some semblance of order on the Frontier without
resorting to large, expensive, and much resented punitive expeditions.
Many at first questioned the logic of providing arms to the Wazirs,
Mahsuds and other tribes who had over the years built up such a reputation
for violence, cunning, and unscrupulous behavior. Of course there were
numerous minor incidents over the next few years that lent credence to
this view, but by and large the Militias worked, and the Frontier remained
fairly quiet up to the Great War. During the test of 1914-1918, several
punitive expeditions and blockades had to be undertaken, but the Militias
again proved themselves to be generally reliable and useful. This was to
change once the Third Afghan War of 1919 began.
The Afghan invasion of British India in May 1919 proved to be too great of
a strain on the loyalties of most trans-Frontier tribesmen.
The first to break was the Khyber Rifles. Soon after the outbreak of
hostilities, they showed signs of unsteadiness and increasing numbers
began to desert. As such, it was decided to disband the entire corps
before anything disastrous could occour.
In neighbouring Waziristan, the advance of a large Afghan force under the
command of Nadir Khan resulted in the withdrawal of the North Waziristan
and South Waziristan Militias from their posts. Although tactically sound,
this decision only reinforced wild rumors that the British were beaten for
good. Virtually all Wazirs and Mahsuds in the North Waziristan Militia
soon deserted with their arms. Many of the other enlisted tribesmen
however kept their heads, and there was much less bloodshed than there
might otherwise have been.
On 21st May 1919, Major G.H.Russell, Commandant of the South
Waziristan Militia, learnt of Nadir Khan's advance. Soon afterwards he
received orders from the Chief Commissioner to abandon his posts, and
retire on Mogul Kot thirty-four miles to the south. At the time, the
strength of the South Waziristan Militia totaled eight British officers,
thirty-seven Pathan officers, and eighteen-hundred other ranks. Of this
number, just over one thousand were Wazirs and Afridis, both of which had
so far proven to be totally unreliable. The remainder were made up of
Khattaks, Orakzais, and smaller numbers of Shirannis, Yusafzais, Gaduns
and Bhittannis.
Major Russell's plan was to evacuate Wana on 26th May in an
orderly fashion, taking with him a sufficient amount of water, transport,
arms, and what treasure there was. All surplus ammunition and supplies
were to be destroyed. He would then pass the western posts of the South
Waziristan Militia and pick up their garrisons. Two other British officers
with a small escort were to leave slightly earlier to pick up the
garrisons of the Militia's three eastern posts.
At 6 P.M. on 26th May, Captain Traill and Lieutenant Hunt left
with their escort for the eastern posts. Soon afterwards, Major Russell
informed his Pathan officers that they must prepare to withdraw in short
order. At first everything went according to plan, but it didn't take long
for the Wazirs with some Afridis to seize the keep with its treasure and
arms. Efforts were made to come to terms with the mutineers, but to no
avail. At 9.45 P.M., Major Russell had no choice but to begin the journey,
leaving everything of value behind in Waziri hands. He had with him five
British officers, roughly three hundred loyal Pathan officers and men, and
over one hundred unarmed Indian followers, such as shopkeepers,
water-carriers, and so on.
The column marched the first twenty miles straight through the night. At
7.00 A.M., they reached the first Militia post at Toi Khula. Instead of
being welcomed, they were fired upon by its mostly Waziri garrison. It
seems that news of Russell's retreat arrived before he did. Again left
with little choice, Russell was forced to carry on to the next post at
Moghal Kot, a distance of another fourteen miles.
As morning turned into afternoon, the column was subjected to the brutal
heat of the mid-day sun. Water was short, and the men and especially the
followers grew weary. Soon, despite the best efforts of Russell and his
British and Pathan officers, the column began to spread out. More
threatening than the elements and fatigue however were the increasing
numbers of hosilte tribesmen all around them. In addition to heavy
sniping, the tribesmen harassed the rearguard with ever increasing
boldness. As the day wore on, the sniping became so intense that Russell
was forced to piquet his route, which only slowed the column even further.
When Russell reached the Tesh Plain he was joined by two friendly parties.
The first was that led by Captain Traill, who had caught up after picking
up those still loyal from the eastern posts. The second was a platoon of
South Waziristan Militia Sherannis led by its Subadar. Having originally
deserted back at Wana, they apparently had second thoughts about their
disloyalty, and their return was most welcome.
As the column came within two miles of Mogul Kot, they met elements of the
Zhob Militia, which had come up to support Russell's retreat. This greatly
aided matters. Reaching Mogul Kot by nightfall, it soon became evident
however that the fort could only offer temporary relief. Being just large
enough to accommodate all the men and followers, the animals had to be
left outside, and there was only enough rations to last a couple of days .
Russell wanted to push on as soon as possible, but his column, and
especially the followers, were exhausted and badly needed rest.
During this time, a number of stragglers came in, and a party of one
British Officer and seven Sowars of the South Waziristan Militia also
arrived. Meanwhile, the tribesmen had used the rest period to greatly
increase their numbers. Now surrounding Mogul Kot, they continued on with
their heavy sniping inflicting numerous casualties.
By 30th May, the column was ready to move on to Mir Ali Khel,
which was yet another fourteen miles south. Of these fourteen miles, the
last seven were to have been piqueted by the Zhob Militia. One hundred
mounted infantry of the Zhob Militia was also to met Russell as he left
Mogul Kot at 6.30 A.M.
By 8.30 A.M., they still had not arrived, so Russell decided he could not
wait any longer. When the front doors of the fort were opened, Russell was
met with a barrage of enemy fire that completely prevented their exit.
Quickly closing the doors back up, a hole was instead made in the back of
the fort with what tools they had.
Filing out through the rear, the retreat started off badly and only got
worse. The very first piquet sent out by Russell went too far ahead, and
ignored all signals to return. At the sight of this, much of the column
lost heart and discipline, and many began to make for Mir Ali Khel as fast
as they could, often abandoning their arms along the way. Little could be
done to stop the ensuing panic. From the Official History:
The officers attempted to stem the route but in no case with success, for
when an officer turned away from those he had collected, the men
immediately disappeared. After four or five miles had thus been traversed
the mounted infantry of the Zhob Militia appeared in sight holding piquets
to cover the progress of the column. Efforts were again made to rally and
re-organize the South Waziristan Militia in the rear of the Zhob Cavalry.
These were partly successful, but the men were quite out of hand; the
Pathan officers and N.C.O.s no longer had authority, and there were very
few men who were at that time in possession of their rifles.
Casualties were heavy during this final retreat. Five British officers
were killed, including Captain Traill, and two wounded. One of these was
Major Russell, who was shot through both legs. Only one British officer,
Lieutenant Barker, survived unscathed. Eight Pathan officers were also
killed and an estimated forty Other Ranks became casualties, including
8843 Lance-Naik Mirzak. Most of these losses occurred within a mile or so
of Mogul Kot, when the officers and N.C.O.'s attempted to bring about some
order.
The consequences of the collapse of the South Waziristan Militia were
serious. Over one thousand rifles and seven-hundred thousand rounds of
.303 ammunition were lost. The Militia's route also brought other tribes,
such as the Mando Khel and Sheranni, into open revolt.
In the end, it would take some of the most intense fighting the Frontier
had ever seen to bring order back to Waziristan. Thereafter, a new
'Forward Policy' was adopted to keep much closer tabs on the Wazirs and
Mahsuds.
Despite the wishes of some, the North and South Waziristan Militias were
eventually reconstituted as the North and South Waziristan Scouts. Many
important lessons were learnt however as to who could be relied upon in
the future, and who could not.
As for Lance-Naik Mirzak, it is impossible to know the exact role he
played during the retreat of the South Waziristan Militia. He may have
been one of the N.C.O.'s who desperately tried to keep order on 30th
May, or he may have been one of those who abandoned his rifle. Perhaps his
conduct fell somewhere in between. At the very least however, Mirzak was
one of the minority who remained loyal at a time when he could have easily
deserted to gather loot, or simply gone home . For this loyalty he paid
with his life.
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